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The key priority for Mali is ensuring that African forces are
ready to take over when French troops leave the country.
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The French military operation in Mali has regained control of much of the country from
Islamic militants. Jeff Gilmour provides an overview of the military situation and identifies a
number of potential problems which must still be overcome. The crucial issue is likely to be
ensuring that the African forces which take over from departing French troops are properly
trained and avoid the logistical issues which have plagued other operations, such as the
MONUSCO peace-keeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Since a military coup toppled the Malian government in March 2012, Northern Mali has
been controlled by a group called al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[1] Init ially joining f orces with
the Tuareg, they soon took charge over Tuareg groups and inf licted a brutal jihadist regime on northern
Mali’s moderate Muslim population. AQIM and their various jihadist af f iliates were heavily armed and
equipped and the badly trained Malian army f orces proved no match f or them. As a result AQIM overran
the northern Malian city of  Gao and the f abled town of  Timbuktu, with its vast historical treasurers. The
north-east of  Mali was no longer controlled f rom Bamako, the capital.
From the beginning of  2013, the situation in this region changed dramatically. With the support of  the UN,
the 15 nation West Af rican bloc ECOWAS stated they would assist Mali by sending in 3,300 troops,
although it was expected to be late 2013 bef ore such a coordinated f orce could be trained and ready to
mount an of f ensive against the insurgents. Strategies were dramatically altered when AQIM and their
supporters started moving South towards the town of  Mopti and the capital in early January 2013. 
Based on the concerns raised by the Malian government, France sent 3,300 troops to the region and to
date have recaptured Timbuktu and Gao, and are still advancing northward to Kidal. The French reported
that 1,600 troops f rom other Af rican countries had joined their operations, such as Chad, Nigeria and
Togo.
There are, however, a number of  basic
questions which should be addressed
bef ore northern Mali is controlled again by
the Malian government. First, when the
French f orces depart Mali, it  will need to
be determined whether the Malian Army
and the projected 5,500 troops f rom
ECOWAS in support will be able to tackle
AQIM and their supporters, who are able
to move f reely throughout the Maghreb in
Niger, Algeria, Mauritania and Libya.
Moreover, Tuaregs in the region have
never trusted the Malian army due to
human rights abuses, and a lack of
discipline and training. Mali’s army has a
history of  polit ical aggressiveness,
chaotic command structures and
resistance to Western military training
methods. The top US commander in Af rica, General Carter Ham, recently crit icised a $500 million training
programme to train the Malian army as a badly f lawed ef f ort, on the basis that it was too f ocused on
tactics and equipment, and did not place enough emphasis on democratic values.
Second, on 10 December 2012 soldiers arrested Mali’s Prime Minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra, who
eventually announced his resignation. This was the second time in a year that Mali has removed a civilian
government. One year bef orehand Malian junior of f icers also overthrew an elected government. On the
surf ace, civilians are in control of  the country, but many outsiders would argue that the strings of
government continue to be pulled by the army. It is questionable whether a democratically elected
government can govern the country, or whether of f icers in the Malian army would again seize control of
power in Bamako. At the present t ime it would seem that the Malian army has signif icant inf luence over
the f uture leader of  the country f ollowing new elections.
Finally, a recent conf erence in Addis Ababa outlined plans to raise f unds f or both the military mission in
Mali once French troops depart the country, and also f or the purposes of  distributing humanitarian aid to
the Malian population. Some $455 million was pledged by countries f or the Af rican- led International
Support Mission to Mali.  The US pledged $96 million and the European Union $67.5 million. Japan
pledged $120 million f or humanitarian aid alone.
It will be interesting to see how ef f ective a 5,500 member ECOWAS f orce will be in countering the AQIM
insurgents in the north-east of  Mali, once the French troops depart the country. Many crit ics would argue
that increased training f or Af rican troops is required and adequate military equipment is needed to cover
a vast territory the size of  France. The US could provide intelligence inf ormation and drones to track
down and destroy insurgent camps located throughout the remote desert sites. Other nations could
assist ECOWAS f orces with airlif t assistance and logistical support.
With 15 nations taking part in the ECOWAS f orce, it will be important f or the command structure to be
properly organised and f or coordination to be maintained among the various Af rican nations contributing
to the insurgency operations. One UN military support operation in the Democratic Republic of  the
Congo recently came under heavy crit icism in similar circumstances. The peacekeeping mission, termed
MONUSCO, numbers 18,000 troops f rom India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Uruguay, Egypt, Nepal and South
Af rica at a cost of  $1.4 billion a year to operate, but suf f ers f rom substantial logistical problems. In a
2011 report, Human Rights Watch stated that MONUSCO f orces have a serious shortage of  well- trained
and equipped peacekeepers, intelligence analysts, interpreters, helicopters and military assets such as
f ire support.
It will be crit ical to ensure that the same logistical dif f icult ies which have plagued the MONUSCO
operation do not arise with the ECOWAS f orce in Mali, af ter the French troops have departed the
country.
[1] A splinter group called the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) also
operates with AQIM.
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